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Abstract
We develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world where the quality of the
match between a rm and its managers changes stochastically over time. Shocks to managerial
productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers.
Our key positive result shows that the rms optimal retention decisions become more permissive
with time. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is e¢ cient, the rms contract
either induces excessive retention at all tenure levels, or excessive ring at the early stages of the
relationship, followed by excessive retention after su¢ ciently long tenure.
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1 Introduction
The job security and pay of a rms top manager typically rests on the rms consistently good
performance and future prospects. This makes sense given the substantial impact that top managers
are believed to have on rms fortunes. At the same time, the environment in which most rms
operate has become increasingly dynamic, implying that managers who are able to deliver high
prots in the present may not be able to do so in the future.1 Shocks to managerial productivity may
originate from the opening of new markets, the arrival of new technologies, industry consolidation,
or the introduction of new legislation.
The contracts that successful rms o¤er to their top employees are thus designed not only to
incentivize their e¤ort but also to guarantee the desired level of turnover. This is not an easy task
given that managers typically have superior information than the board about the determinants of
the rms prots, the quality of their match with the rm, and the evolution of their own productivity.
Optimal contracts must therefore provide managers with incentives not only to exert e¤ort but also
to report promptly to the board variations in the environment that a¤ect the rms prospects under
their own control and for leaving the rm when these prospects deteriorate (equivalently, when the
quality of their match with the rm is not satisfactory anymore).
In this paper, we develop a dynamic theory of managerial contracting which, in addition to the
familiar theme of incentivizing e¤ort, accounts explicitly for the following possibilities: (i) managerial
ability to generate prots is bound to change (stochastically) over time; (ii) shocks to managerial
productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting, but privately observed by the managers; (iii)
at each point in time, the board can respond to poor future prospects by replacing an incumbent
manager with a new hire; (iv) the rms performance under each new hire is going to be a¤ected by
the same information frictions as in the relationship with the incumbent.
Accounting for these possibilities not only is realistic, it sheds new light on the joint dynamics
(and ine¢ ciency) of e¤ort, retention, and compensation decisions.
Model Preview. In each period, the rms cash ows are the result of (i) the incumbent
managers productivity (equivalently, the quality of the match between the rm and the manager
hereafter the managers type), (ii) managerial e¤ort, and (iii) noise. Each managers productivity
is positively correlated over time and each manager has private information about his current and
past productivity, as well as about his e¤ort choices. The board only observes the stream of cash
ows generated by each manager.
Upon separating from the incumbent, the rm goes back to the labor market and is randomly
matched with a new manager of unknown productivity. Each managers initial productivity (i.e., his
productivity at the time of contracting) is the managers own private information. Upon joining the
1See, for example, Fine (1998), who argues that technology is increasing the speed at which business environments
evolve across a plethora of industries.
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rm, each managers productivity evolves according to the same stochastic process. This process is
meant to capture how the interaction of the environment with the tasks that the manager is asked to
perform a¤ects the evolution of the managers productivity. The environment is perfectly stationary
in the sense that the rm faces the same problem with each manager it hires. As a result, the board
o¤ers the same menu of contracts to each manager.2 ;3
A contract is described by (i) an e¤ort policy specifying in each period the e¤ort recommended
to the manager; (ii) a retention policy specifying in each period whether the manager will be retained
in the next period or permanently red, and (iii) a compensation policy specifying in each period the
managers compensation. The rst two policy functions can depend upon past and current (self-)
reported managerial productivity and past cash ows, while the current periods compensation policy
can in addition depend on the current periods cash ow.4
The positive and normative properties of the joint dynamics of e¤ort, turnover, and performance
are identied by characterizing the contract that maximizes the rms expected prots (net of man-
agerial compensation) and comparing it to the contract that a benevolent planner would o¤er to
each manager to maximize welfare (dened to be the sum of the rms expected cash ows and of
all managersexpected payo¤s hereafter, the e¢ cient contract). Both the prot-maximizing and
the e¢ cient contracts are obtained by comparing, after each history, the value of continuing the
relationship with the incumbent (taking into account the dynamics of future e¤ort and retention
decisions) with the expected value from starting a new relationship with a manager of unknown
productivity. Importantly, both these values are evaluated from an ex-ante perspective, i.e., at the
time each manager is hired. Given the stationarity of the environment, the payo¤ from hiring a
new manager must coincide with the payo¤ that the rm expected from hiring the incumbent. Both
the prot-maximizing and the e¢ cient contracts are thus obtained through a xed-point dynamic-
programming problem that internalizes all relevant trade-o¤s and whose solution endogenizes the
2While our analysis focuses on a representative rm, both our positive and normative results apply also to certain
competitive labor markets where, after dismissal, managers go back to the market and are randomly matched with
other identical rms.
3What makes a policy of selling the rm to the managerssuboptimal is the fact that the managers have private
information about their abilities to generate prots for the rm. This private information, since it originates in
idiosyncratic characteristics as well as past working experiences, is present from the very rst moment a manager is
matched with the rm and has persistent (although typically diminishing) e¤ects over time. Because of such private
information, if the rm were sold to the managers, then any type above the lowest would get the full surplus of his
higher productivity. To extract some of this surplus, the board of directors instead retains control of the rm and
introduces distortions in the contracts which govern managerse¤ort and separation decisions.
4 In general, a turnover policy based solely on observed cash ows cannot induce the optimal sequence of separation
decisions. It may be essential that managers keep communicating with the board, e.g., by explaining the determinants
of past performances and/or by describing the rms prospects under their control. A key role of the optimal contract
in our theory is precisely to induce a prompt exchange of information between the managers and the board, in addition
to the more familiar role of incentivizing e¤ort through performance-based compensation.
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rms separation payo¤.5
Key positive results. Our key positive prediction is that the rms optimal retention decisions
become more permissive with time: the productivity level that the rm requires for each manager
to be retained declines with the number of periods that the manager has been working for the rm.
This result originates from the combination of the following two assumptions: (i) the e¤ect of a
managers initial productivity on his future productivities declines over time;6 and (ii) variations in
managerial productivity are anticipated, but privately observed.
The explanation rests on the boards desire to pay the most productive managers just enough to
separate them from the less productive ones. Similar to La¤ont and Tirole (1986), the resulting rent
originates from the possibility for the most productive managers of generating the same distribution
of present and future cash ows as the less productive ones by working less, thus economizing on
the disutility of e¤ort. Contrary to La¤ont and Tiroles static analysis, in our dynamic environment
rms have two instruments to limit such rents: rst, they can induce less productive managers
to work less (e.g., by o¤ering them contracts with low-powered incentives where compensation is
relatively insensitive to realized cash ows); in addition, they can commit to a replacement policy
that is more severe to a manager whose initial productivity is low in terms of the future productivity
and performance levels required for retention. Both instruments play the role of discouraging those
managers who are most productive at the contracting stage from mimicking the less productive ones
and are thus most e¤ective when targeted at those managers whose initial productivity is low.
The key observation is that, when the e¤ect of a managers initial productivity on his subsequent
productivity declines over time, the e¤ectiveness of such instruments is higher when they are used
at the early stages of the relationship than in the distant future. The reason is that, from the
perspective of a manager who is initially most productive, his ability to do betterthan a manager
who is initially less productive is prominent at the early stages, but expected to decline over time
due to the imperfect serial dependence of the productivity process.
The rms prot-maximizing retention policy is then obtained by trading o¤ two considerations.
On the one hand, the desire to respond promptly and e¢ ciently to variations in the environment that
a¤ect the rms prospects under the incumbents control, of course taking into account the dynamics
of future e¤ort and retention decisions. This concern calls for retaining managers whose productivity
is expected to remain or turn high irrespective of whether or not their initial productivity was low.
On the other hand, the value of o¤ering a contract that reduces the compensation that the rm
must pay to the managers who are most productive at the hiring stage. This second concern calls for
committing to a retention policy that is most severe to those managers whose initial productivity is
5Note that endogenizing the payo¤ the rm expects after separating from each incumbent manager is essential to
the normative results in the paper.
6Below, we provide a formal statement of this assumption in terms of a statistical property of the process governing
the evolution of managerial productivity.
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low. However, because the value of such commitments declines with the length of the employment
relationship, the prot-maximizing retention policy becomes gradually more lenient over time.
Our theory thus o¤ers a possible explanation for what in the eyes of an external observer may look
like "entrenchment". That managers with a longer tenure are retained under the same conditions
that would have called for separation at a shorter tenure is, in our theory, the result of a fully optimal
contract, as opposed to the result of a lack of commitment or of good governance. In this respect, our
explanation is fundamentally di¤erent from the alternative view that managers with longer tenure
are "entrenched" because they are able to exert more inuence over the board, either because of
manager-specic investments, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1989), or because of the appointment of
less independent directors, as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) see also, Weisbach (1988), Denis,
Denis, and Sarin (1997), Hadlock and Lumer (1997), Rose and Shepard (1997), Almazan and Suarez
(2003), Bebchuk and Fried (2004), and Fisman, Kuhrana, and Rhodes-Kropf (2005).
Key normative results. Turning to the normative results, we nd that, compared to what is
e¢ cient, the rms prot-maximizing contract either induces excessive retention at all tenure levels,
or excessive ring at the early stages of the relationship, followed by excessive retention in the long
run. By excessive retention we mean the following. Any manager who is red after t periods of
employment under the prot-maximizing contract is either red in the same period or earlier under
the e¢ cient policy. By excessive ring we mean the exact opposite: any manager red at the end of
period t under the e¢ cient policy is either red at the end of the same period or earlier under the
prot-maximizing contract.
The result that retention decisions become less e¢ cient over time may appear in contrast to
ndings in the dynamic mechanism design literature that "distortions" in optimal contracts typically
decrease over time and vanish in the long-run. (This property has been documented by various
authors, going back at least to Besankos (1985) seminal work; see Battaglini (2005) for a recent
contribution, and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012) for a unifying explanation based on the statistical
property of declining impulse responses).
The reason why we do not nd convergence to e¢ ciency in the setting of this paper is that the
rms endogenous separation payo¤ (that is, the payo¤ that the rm expects from going back to the
labor market and o¤ering the prot-maximizing contract to each new manager) is lower than the
planners endogenous separation payo¤ (that is, the surplus that the planner expects by forcing the
rm to go back to the labor market and o¤er the welfare-maximizing contract to each new manager).
Indeed, the fact that each manager has private information about his own productivity at the time
of contracting means that the rm cannot extract the full surplus from the relationship with each
manager while inducing him to work e¢ ciently. As explained above, the rm expects, at the time
of hiring, to extract more surplus from the relationship with each incumbent as time goes by, with
the ow payo¤ of the rm eventually converging to the ow total surplus that a benevolent planner
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would expect by retaining the same incumbent. The fact that the rm expects a lower payo¤ than
the planner from going back to the labor market then implies that, eventually, the rm becomes
excessively lenient in retaining its incumbents, relative to what is e¢ cient.7
This last result suggests that policy interventions aimed at inducing rms to sustain a higher
turnover, e.g., by o¤ering them temporary tax incentives after a change in management, or through
the introduction of a mandatory retirement age for top employees, can, in principle, increase welfare.8
Of course, such policies might be expected to encounter opposition on other grounds whose discussion
is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section we briey
review the pertinent literature. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes the e¢ cient
contract. Section 4 characterizes the rms prot-maximizing contract and uses it to establish the key
positive results. Section 5 compares the dynamics of retention decisions under the e¢ cient contract
with those under the prot-maximizing contract and establishes the key normative results. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
1.1 Related literature
The paper is related to various lines of research in the managerial compensation and turnover lit-
erature. A vast body of work documents how the threat of replacement plays an important role in
incentivizing e¤ort.9 Recent contributions in this area include Tchistyi (2005), Clementi and Hopen-
hayn (2006), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), Biais et al. (2007), and
He (2009). The reason why the threat of termination is essential in these papers is that the agent is
protected by limited liability. This implies that incentives provided entirely through performance-
based compensation need not be strong enough. The threat of termination is also crucial in the
e¢ ciency wages theory; in particular, see Shapiro and Stiglitzs (1984) seminal work. However,
contrary to the literature cited above, in the e¢ ciency-wages theory, under the optimal contract, no
worker shirks and hence replacement does not occur in equilibrium.
Related to this line of research is also the work by Spear and Wang (2005), Wang (2008) and
Sannikov (2008). These papers show how a risk-averse agent may be optimally induced to cease to
exert e¤ort and then retire, once his promised continuation utility becomes either too high or too
low, making it too costly for the rm to incentivize further e¤ort.10
7Note that this result also applies to a setting in which optimal e¤ort is constant over time.
8See Lazear (1979) for alternative explanations for why mandatory retirement can be benecial.
9Despite the vast attention that this property has received in the theoretical literature, the empirical evidence of
the e¤ect of turnover on incentives is mixed. See Jenter and Lewellen (2010) for a recent discussion and Gayle, Golan,
and Miller (2008) for a recent empirical study of the relationship between promotion, turnover, and compensation in
the market for executives.
10Another paper where dismissal helps creating incentives is Sen (1996). In this paper, the managers private
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While not all the works cited above focus explicitly on turnover, they do o¤er implications for the
dynamics of retention decisions. For example, Wang (2008) shows how a worker with a shorter tenure
faces a higher probability of an involuntary layo¤ and a lower probability of voluntary retirement
than a worker with a longer tenure. In a nancial contracting setting, Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006) show how, on average, a borrowers promised continuation utility increases over time and how
this requires an increase in the likelihood that the loan is rolled over. Similarly, Fong and Li (2010)
nd that the turnover rate eventually decreases in the duration of the employment relationship, but,
because contracts are relational, they also nd that the turnover rate may initially increase. In the
same spirit, Board (2011) nds that rmsretention decisions become ine¢ ciently lenient after long
tenure when they are governed by a relational contract.11
The above literature does not account for the possibility of changes in managerial productivity
(equivalently, in the quality of the match between the manager and the rm). It therefore misses the
possibility that turnover is driven by variations in managerial productivity in addition to concerns
for incentivizing e¤ort. Such a possibility has long been recognized as important by another body of
the literature that dates back at least to Jovanovic (1979).12 This paper considers an environment
where productivity (equivalently, the match quality) is constant over time but unknown to both
the rm and the worker who jointly learn it over time through the observation of realized output.
Because of learning, turnover becomes less likely over time.13 Our theory di¤ers from Jovanovic
(1979) in a few respects. First, and importantly, we allow learning about match quality to be
asymmetric between the workers and the rm, with the former possessing superior information than
the latter. Second, we explicitly model managerial e¤ort and account for the fact that it must
be incentivized. Third, we consider more general processes for the evolution of the match quality.
These distinctions lead to important di¤erences in the results. First, while in Jovanovics model
the leniency of turnover decisions originates from the accumulation of information over time, in our
model turnover decisions become more lenient over time even when conditioning on the accuracy
of available information (formally, even when the kernels, i.e., the transition probabilities, remain
constant over time). Second, while in Jovanovics model turnover decisions are always second-best
information is the productivity of the rm, which is assumed to be constant over time and independent of the manager
who runs it. As in the current paper, commitments to replace the initial manager help reducing informational rents.
However, contrary to the current paper, there are no hidden actions and there is a single replacement decision. The
analysis in Sen (1996) thus does not permit one to study how the leniency of retention decisions evolves over time.
11A key di¤erence between the result in Board (2011) and the one in the present paper is that, while ine¢ ciency in
his model originates in the rms inability to committ to long-term contracts, which can be viewed as a form of "lack
of good governance," in our model is entirely due to asymmetric information.
12Allgood and Farrell (2003) provide empirical support for the importance of variations in managerial productivity
and, more generally, in match quality for turnover decisions.
13Related is also Holmstroms (1999) career concerns model. While this paper does not characterize the optimal
turnover policy, the evolution of career concerns has been recognized as a possible determinant for turnover; see, for
example, Mukherjee (2008).
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e¢ cient, in our model, turnover decisions are second-best ine¢ cient and the ine¢ ciency of such
decisions typically increases over time.14
More recent papers where turnover is also driven by variations in match quality include Acharya
(1992), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Atkeson and Cole (2005), and McAdams (2011). Acharya
(1992) studies how the market value of a rm changes after the announcement to replace a CEO and
how the probability of replacement is a¤ected by the CEOs degree of risk aversion.15 Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) show how the optimal turnover policy takes the form of a simple threshold
policy, with the threshold being constant over time. Along with the assumption that productivity is
drawn independently each time it changes and the fact that the revisions follow a Poisson process,
this implies that the probability of terminating a relationship does not vary with tenure. In contrast,
in a model of stochastic partnerships, McAdams (2011) nds that relationships become more stable
over time due to a survivorship bias. Atkeson and Cole (2005) show how managers who delivered
high performance in the past have a higher continuation utility and are then optimally rewarded
with job stability. Because a longer tenure implies a higher probability of having delivered a high
performance in the past, their model also o¤ers a possible explanation for why retention decisions
may become more lenient over time.
An important distinction between our paper and the two bodies of the literature discussed above
is that, in our theory, variations in match quality are anticipated but privately observed. As a result, a
properly designed contract must not only incentivize e¤ort but also provide managers with incentives
for truthfully reporting to the board variations in match quality that call for adjustments in the
compensation scheme and possibly for separation decisions. The importance of private information
for turnover decisions has been recognized by another body of the literature that includes Levitt
and Snyder (1997), Banks and Sundaram (1998), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008), Gayle, Golan and
Miller (2008), Inderst and Mueller (2010) and Yang (forthcoming). Some of these papers show how
asymmetric information may lead to a form of entrenchment, i.e., to situations in which the agent
remains in place (or the project continues) although the principal would prefer ex-post to replace him
(or discontinue the project). What is missing in this literature is an account of the possibility that
the managersprivate information may change over time and hence an analysis of how the leniency
of optimal turnover decisions evolves with the managerstenure in the rm.16
14 Ine¢ ciencies originate in our theory from the combination of asymmetric information at the contracting stage with
search frictions. Because neither the rms nor the managers can appropriate the entire surplus, contractual decisions
are distorted relative to their second-best counterparts.
15Acharya (1992) also documents the possible optimality of permanently tenuring a CEO, a possibility that we also
accomodate but which we show to never be optimal in our model.
16An exception is Gayle, Golan and Miller (2008). They use a longitudinal data set to evaluate the importance of
moral hazard and job experience in jointly determining promotion, turnover rates, and compensation, and to study how
the latter changes across the di¤erent layers of an organization. The focus of their analysis is, however, very di¤erent
from ours.
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Another important di¤erence between our work and each of the various papers mentioned above
is that it o¤ers an analysis of how the ine¢ ciency of turnover decisions evolves over time. To the best
of our knowledge, this analysis has no precedents in the literature. As explained above, this is made
possible by endogenizing the rms separation payo¤ and recognizing that the relationship with each
new hire is going to be a¤ected by the same frictions as the one with each incumbent. Recognizing
this possibility is essential to our normative result about the excessive leniency of retention decisions
after a long tenure.
From a methodological viewpoint, the paper builds on recent developments in the theory of dy-
namic mechanism design with persistent shocks to the agentsprivate information17 and in particular
on Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2012).18 Among other things, that paper (i) establishes an envelope
theorem for dynamic stochastic problems which is instrumental to the design of optimal dynamic
mechanisms and (ii) shows how the dynamics of distortions is driven by the dynamics of the impulse
responses of the future types to the initial ones. The current paper applies these insights and, more
generally, the methodology of Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2012), to a managerial contracting envi-
ronment. It also shows how the techniques in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012) must be adapted to
accommodate moral hazard in a non-time-separable dynamic mechanism design setting. The core
(and distinctive) contribution of the present paper is, however, in the predictions that the theory
identies for the joint dynamics of e¤ort, retention, and compensation.
Related is also Garrett and Pavan (2011b). That work shares with the present paper the same
managerial contracting framework. However, it completely abstracts from the possibility of re-
placement, which is the focus of the present paper. Instead, it investigates how the optimality
of seniority-based schemes (that is, schemes that provide managers with longer tenure with more
high-powered incentives) is a¤ected by the managersdegree of risk aversion.19 In particular, that
paper shows that, under risk neutrality and declining impulse responses, optimal e¤ort increases,
on average, with time. The same property holds in the present paper, but is not essential for the
17The literature on dynamic mechanism design goes back to the pioneering work of Baron and Besanko (1984)
and Besanko (1985). More recent contributions include Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Eso and Szentes
(2007), Athey and Segal (2007), Board (2008), Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009a,b, 2010a,b,c, 2012), Bergemann and
Välimäki (2010), Board and Skrzypacz (2010), Dizdar et al., (2011), Pai and Vohra (2011), Garrett (2011), and Said
(forthcoming). For a survey of these papers see Bergemann and Said (2011).
18The analysis in the current paper, as well as in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012), is in discrete time. Recent
contributions in continuous time include Zhang (2009), Williams (2011) and Strulovici (2011). These works show
how the solution to a class of dynamic adverse selection problems with persistent private information (but without
replacement) can be obtained in a recursive way with the level and derivative of promised utility as state variables.
In contrast, both the optimal and the e¢ cient contracts in our paper are obtained through a xed-point dynamic
programming problem whose solution is not recursive, thus permitting us to show how e¤ort, compensation, and
retention decisions depend explicitly on the entire history of productivity shocks.
19While, for simplicity, the current paper does not account for the possibility that the managers are risk averse, we
expect our key predictions to remain true for a low degree of risk aversion.
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dynamics of retention decisions. In fact, while we nd it instructive to relate these dynamics to the
ones for e¤ort, neither our positive nor our normative results hinge on the property that e¤ort, on
average, increases with tenure: the same results hold if the rm is constrained to ask the same level
of e¤ort from the manager in all periods.20
Obviously related is also the entire literature on dynamic managerial compensation without
replacement. This literature is too vast to be successfully summarized here. We refer the reader
to Edmans and Gabaix (2009) for an overview. See also Edmans and Gabaix (2011), and Edmans,
Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012) for recent contributions where, as in La¤ont and Tirole (1986)
and in the current paper, the moral hazard problem is solved using techniques from the mechanism
design literature. These works consider a setting where (i) there is no turnover, (ii) managers
possess no private information at the time of contracting, and (iii) it is optimal to induce a constant
level of e¤ort over time. Relaxing (i) and (ii) is essential to our results. As explained above,
endogenizing e¤ort is also important for our predictions about the joint dynamics of e¤ort, retention,
and compensation, but is not essential to the key properties identied in this paper.
2 Model
Players. A principal (the board of directors, acting on behalf of the shareholders of the rm) is in
charge of designing a new employment contract to govern the rms interaction with its managers.21
The rm is expected to operate for innitely many periods and each manager is expected to live as
long as the rm. There are innitely many managers. All managers are ex-ante identical, meaning
that they have the same preferences and that their productivity (to be interpreted as their ability to
generate cash ows for the rm) is drawn independently from the same distribution and is expected
to evolve over time according to the same Markov process described below.
Stochastic process. The process governing the evolution of each managers productivity is
assumed to be independent of calendar time and exogenous to the rms decisions. This process has
two components: the distribution from which each managers initial productivity is drawn, and the
20For example, dynamics of retention decisions qualitatively similar to the ones in this paper arise in an environment
where e¤ort can take only negative values, say e 2 [ K; 0]; and where e = 0 is interpreted as "no stealing" and is
optimally sustained at all periods, as in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007).
21As anticipated above, the focus of the analysis is on the contracts o¤ered by a representative rm for given contracts
o¤ered by all other competing rms (equivalently, for given managersoutside options). However, the prot-maximizing
and e¢ cient contracts characterized below are also equilibrium and welfare-maximizing contracts in a setting where
unemployed managers are randomly matched with many (ex-ante identical) rms. Indeed, as it will become clear, as
long as the number of potential managers is large compared to the number of competing rms, so that the matching
probabilities remain independent of the contracts selected, then the managersoutside options (i.e., their payo¤ after
separation occurs) have an e¤ect on the level of compensation but not on the prot-maximizing and e¢ cient e¤ort and
retention policies.
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family of conditional distributions describing how productivity evolves upon joining the rm.
For each t  1, let t denote a managers productivity in the t-th period of employment. Each
managers productivity during the rst period of employment coincides with his productivity prior
to joining the rm. This productivity is drawn from the absolutely continuous distribution F1 with
support  = (; )  R and density function f1: The distribution F1 is meant to capture the
distribution of managerial talent in the population.
For all t > 1, t is drawn from the cumulative distribution function F (jt 1) with support .22
We assume that the function F is continuously di¤erentiable over 2 and denote by f(tjt 1) 
@F (tjt 1)=@t the density of the cumulative distribution F (jt 1). We assume that, for any
t; t 1 2 ;  f(tjt 1)  @F (tjt 1)=@t 1  0. This guarantees (i) that the conditional dis-
tributions can be ranked according to rst-order stochastic dominance, and (ii) that the impulse
responses (which are dened below and which capture the processs degree of persistence) are uni-
formly bounded.23
Given F1 and the family F  hF (j)i2 of conditional distributions, we then dene the impulse
responses of future productivity to earlier productivity as follows (the denition here parallels that
in Pavan, Segal and Toikka, 2012). Let ~" be a random variable uniformly distributed over E = [0; 1]
and note that, for any  2 ; the random variable z (;~")  F 1(~"j) is distributed according to
F (j) by the Integral Transform Probability Theorem. For any  2 N, then let Z : E !  be
the function dened inductively as follows: Z1(; ")  z(; "); Z2(; "1; "2) = z(Z1(; "1); "2) and so
forth.24 For any s and t; s < t; and any continuation history ts  (s; :::; t); the impulse response
of t to s is then dened by
J ts
 
ts
  @Zt s(s; "t s(ts))
@s
where "t s(ts) denotes the unique sequence of shocks that, starting from s, leads to the continua-
22The process is thus time autonomous : the kernels are independent of the length of the employment relationship
so that Ft (j) = F (j) all t > 1. Each kernel has support on the same interval  that denes the support of the
period-1 distribution F1. Both of these assumptions, as well as many of the technical conditions below, are stronger
than needed for our results, but simplify the exposition. See the working paper version of the manuscript, Garrett and
Pavan (2011a), for how to accomodate non time-autonomous processes with shifting supports and Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka (2012) for how to relax some of the technical conditions. On the other hand, allowing for more than two periods
is essential to our results about the dynamics of retention decisions. Allowing for more than two productivity levels is
also essential. In fact, one can easily verify that, with two productivity levels, the optimal retention policy takes one
of the following three forms: (i) either the manager is never replaced, irrespective of the evolution of his productivity;
or (ii) he is retained if and only if his initial productivity was high; or (iii) he is red as soon as his productivity turns
low. In each case, the retention policy (i.e., whether the manager is retained as a function of his period-t productivity)
is independent of the length of the employment relationship.
23The lower bound on @F (tjt 1)=@t 1 is equivalent to assuming that, for any t 1 2 , any x 2 R,
1   F (t 1 + xjt 1) is nonincreasing in t 1: That is, the probability that a managers productivity in period t
exceeds the one in the previous period by more than x is nonincreasing in the previous periods productivity.
24Throughout the entire manuscript, we will use superscripts to denote sequences of variables.
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tion history ts: These impulse response functions are the nonlinear analogs of the familiar constant
linear impulse responses for autoregressive processes. For example, in the case of an AR(1) process
with persistence parameter , the impulse response of t to s is simply given by the scalar J ts = 
t s:
More generally, the impulse response J ts
 
ts

captures the e¤ect of an innitesimal variation of s
on t, holding constant the shocks "t s(ts). As shown below, these functions play a key role in
determining the dynamics of prot-maximizing e¤ort and turnover policies.
Throughout, we will maintain the assumption that types evolve independently across managers.
E¤ort, cash ows, and payo¤s. After learning his period-t productivity t, the manager
currently employed by the rm must choose an e¤ort level et 2 E = R:25 The rms per-period cash
ows, gross of the managers compensation, are given by
t = t + et + t, (1)
where t is transitory noise. The shocks t are i.i.d. over time, independent across managers, and
drawn from the distribution , with expectation E[~t] = 0. The sequences of productivities t and
e¤ort choices et  (e1; :::; et) 2 Et are the managers private information. In contrast, the history of
cash ows t  (1; :::; t) 2 Rt generated by each manager is veriable and can be used as a basis
for compensation.
By choosing e¤ort e 2 E in period t, the manager su¤ers a disutility  (e)  0 where  () is a
di¤erentiable and Lipschitz continuous function with  (0) = 0. As in La¤ont and Tirole (1986), we
assume that there exists a scalar e > 0 such that  is thrice continuously di¤erentiable over (0; e)
with  0(e);  00(e) > 0 and  000(e)  0 for all e 2 (0; e), and that  0(e) > 1 for all e > e.26 These
last properties guarantee that both the e¢ cient and the prot-maximizing e¤ort levels are interior,
while ensuring that the managers payo¤ is equi-Lipschitz continuous in e¤ort. The latter property
permits us to conveniently express the value function through a di¤erentiable envelope formula (more
below).27
Denoting by ct the compensation that the manager receives in period t (equivalently, his period-
t consumption), the managers preferences over (lotteries over) streams of consumption levels c 
(c1; c2; : : : ) and streams of e¤ort choices e  (e1; e2; :::) are described by an expected utility function
with (Bernoulli) utility given by
UA(c; e) =
1X
t=1
t 1[ct    (et)], (2)
where  < 1 is the (common) discount factor.
25The assumption that e¤ort takes on any real value is only for simplicity.
26Note that these conditions are satised, for example, when e > 1,  (e) = (1=2)e2 for all e 2 (0; e), and  (e) =
ee  e2=2 for all e > e:
27None of the results hinge on the value of e. Indeed, the rms payo¤ is invariant to e (holding constant  over the
interval fe : 0   0 (e)  1g).
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The principals objective is to maximize the discounted sum of the rms expected prots, dened
to be cash ows net of managerial compensation. Formally, let it and cit denote, respectively, the
cash ow generated and the compensation received by the ith manager employed by the rm in his
tth period of employment. Then, let Ti denote the number of periods for which manager i works
for the rm. The contribution of manager i to the rms payo¤, evaluated at the time manager i is
hired, is given by
Xi(
Ti
i ; c
Ti
i ) =
TiX
t=1
t 1 [it   cit] .
Next, denote by I 2 N[f+1g the total number of managers hired by the rm over its innite life.
The rms payo¤, given the cash ows and payments (Tii ; c
Ti
i )
I
i=1, is then given by
UP =
IX
i=1

Pi 1
j=1 TjXi(
Ti
i ; c
Ti
i ). (3)
Given the stationarity of the environment, with an abuse of notation, throughout the entire
analysis, we will omit all indices i referring to the identities of the managers.
Timing and labor market. The rms interaction with the labor market unfolds as follows.
Each manager learns his initial productivity 1 prior to being matched with the rm. After being
matched, the manager is o¤ered a menu of contracts described in detail below. While the rm can
perfectly commit to the contracts it o¤ers, each manager is free to leave the rm at each point in
time. After leaving the rm, the manager receives a continuation payo¤ equal to Uo  0.28
We assume that (i) it is never optimal for the rm to operate without a manager being in
control, (ii) that it is too costly to sample another manager before separating from the incumbent,
and (iii) that all replacement decisions must be planned at least one period in advance. These
assumptions capture (in a reduced form) various frictions in the recruiting process that prevent rms
from sampling until they nd a manager of the highest possible productivity, which is unrealistic
and would make the analysis uninteresting.29
28That the outside option is invariant to the managers productivity is a simplication. All our results extend
qualitatively to a setting where the outside option is type dependent as long as the derivative of the outside option
Uo (t) with respect to current productivity is su¢ ciently small that the single-crossing conditions of Section 4 are
preserved. This is the case, for example, when (i) the discount factor is not very high, and/or (ii) it takes a long time
for a manager to nd a new job. Also note that, from the perspective of the rm under examination, this outside option
is exogenous. However, in a richer setting with multiple identical rms and exogenous matching probabilities, Uo will
coincide with the equilibrium continuation payo¤ that each manager expects from going back to the labor market and
being randomly matched (possibly after an unemployment phase) with another rm. In such an environment, each
managers outside option is both time- and type-invariant (and equal to zero) if there are innitely more managers
than rms.
29The assumption of random matching is also quite standard in the labor/matching literature (see, e.g., Jovanovic,
1979). In our setting, it implies that there is no direct competition among managers for employment contracts. This
distinguishes our environment from an auction-like setting where, in each period, the principal consults simultaneously
with multiple managers and then chooses which one to hire/retain.
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After signing one of the contracts, the manager privately chooses e¤ort e1. Nature then draws
1 from the distribution  and the rms (gross) cash ows 1 are determined according to (1).
After observing the cash ows 1, the rm pays the manager a compensation c1 which may depend
on the specic contract selected by the manager and on the veriable cash ow 1. Based on the
specic contract selected at the time of contracting and on the observed cash ow, the manager is
then either retained or dismissed at the end of the period.30 If the manager is retained, his second-
period productivity is then drawn from the distribution F (j1). After privately learning 2, at the
beginning of the second period of employment, the manager then decides whether or not to leave
the rm. If he leaves, he obtains the continuation payo¤ Uo. If he stays, he is then o¤ered the
possibility of modifying the terms of the contract that pertain to future compensation and retention
decisions within limits specied by the contract signed in the rst period (as it will become clear in
a moment, these adjustments are formally equivalent to reporting the new productivity 2). After
these adjustments are made, the manager privately chooses e¤ort e2, cash ows 2 are realized,
and the manager is then paid a compensation c2 as specied by the original contract along with
the adjustments made at the beginning of the second period (clearly, the compensation c2 may also
depend on the entire history of observed cash ows 2 = (1; 2)). Given the contract initially
signed, the adjustments made in period two, and the observed cash ows 2; the manager is then
either retained into the next period or dismissed at the end of the period.
The entire sequence of events described above repeats itself over time until the rm separates
from the manager or the latter unilaterally decides to leave the rm. After separation occurs, at the
beginning of the subsequent period, the rm goes back to the labor market and is randomly matched
with a new manager whose initial productivity 1 is drawn from the same stationary distribution
F1 from which the incumbents initial productivity was drawn. The relationship between any newly
sampled manager and the rm then unfolds in the same way as described above for the incumbent.
2.1 The employment relationship as a dynamic mechanism
Because all managers are ex-ante identical, time is innite, and types evolve independently across
managers, the rm o¤ers the same menu of contracts to each manager it is matched with. Under
any such contract, the compensation that the rm pays to the manager (as well as the retention
decisions) may depend on the cash ows produced by the manager as well as on messages sent by the
manager over time (as explained above, the role of these messages is to permit the rm to respond to
30That retention decisions are specied explicitly in the contract simplies the exposition but is not essential. For
example, by committing to pay a su¢ ciently low compensation after all histories that are supposed to lead to separation,
the rm can always implement the desired retention policy by delegating to the managers the choice of whether or not
to stay in the relationship. It will become clear from the analysis below that, while both the optimal and the e¢ cient
retention policies are unique, there are many ways these policies can be implemented (see, e.g., Yermack, 2006 for a
description of the most popular termination clauses and "golden handshakes" practices).
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variations in productivity). However, both compensation and retention decisions are independent of
both the calendar time at which the manager was hired and of the history of messages sent and cash
ows generated by other managers. Hereafter, we will thus maintain the notation that t denotes the
number of periods that a representative manager has been working for the rm and not the calendar
time.
Furthermore, because the rm can commit, one can conveniently describe the rms contract as
a direct revelation mechanism. This species, for each period t, a recommended e¤ort choice, the
contingent compensation, and a retention decision.
In principle, both the level of e¤ort recommended and the retention decision may depend on
the history of reported productivities and on the history of cash ow realizations. However, it can
be shown that, under both the e¢ cient and the prot-maximizing contracts, the optimal e¤ort and
retention decisions depend only on reported productivities t:31 This is because any type of manager,
by adjusting his e¤ort level, can generate the same cash ow distribution as any other type, regardless
of the other types e¤ort level and regardless of the noise distribution (in particular, even if the noise is
absent). Cash ows are thus a very weak signal of productivity which is the only serially correlated
state variable and hence play no prominent role in retention and future e¤ort decisions, which are
decisions about productivity.32 On the other hand, because the e¤ort decisions are hidden actions
(i.e., because of moral hazard), it is essential that the total compensation be allowed to depend both
on the reported productivities t as well as on past and current cash ows t.
Hereafter, we will thus model the employment relationship induced by the prot-maximizing and
the e¢ cient contracts as a direct revelation mechanism 
  h; x; i. This consists of a sequences of
functions    t : t ! E1t=1, x   xt : t  Rt ! R1t=1 and    t : t ! f0; 1g1t=1 such that:
 t(t) is the recommended period-t e¤ort;
 xt(t; t) is the compensation paid at the end of period t;
 t(t) is the retention decision for period t, with t(t) = 1 if the manager is to be retained;
which means he is granted the possibility of working for the rm also in period t+1, regardless
of his period-(t+ 1) productivity t+1,33 and t(t) = 0 if (i) either he is dismissed at the end
31A formal proof for this result can be found in the Online Supplementary Material.
32Note that this result would not hold if the manager were risk averse. This is because conditioning retention and
e¤ort decisions on past and current cash ows can help reduce the rms cost of shielding a risk-averse manager from
risk. The result would also not be true if the manager were cash-constrained, in which case committing to re him
after a poor performance may be necessary to incentivize his e¤ort.
33Recall that separation decisions must be planned one period in advance, and that it is too costly to go back to the
labor market and consult another manager before separating from the incumbent. Along with the assumption that it
is never desirable to operate the rm without a manager, these assumptions imply that a manager who is retained at
the end of period t will never be dismissed at the beginning of period t+ 1; irrespective of his period-t+ 1 productivity.
14
of period t, or (ii) he was dismissed in previous periods; i.e., t(t) = 0 implies s(s) = 0 for
all s > t, all s.34 Given any sequence 1, we then denote by  (1)  mint : t  t = 0	
the corresponding length of the employment relationship.
In each period t, given the previous reports ^
t 1
and cash ow realizations t 1, the employment
relationship unfolds as follows:
 After learning his period-t productivity t 2 t, and upon deciding to stay in the relationship,
the manager sends a report ^t 2 t;
 The mechanism then prescribes e¤ort t(^
t 1
; ^t) and species a reward scheme xt(^
t 1
; ^t; 
t 1; ) :
R! R along with a retention decision t(^t 1; ^t);
 The manager then chooses e¤ort et;
 After observing the realized cash ows t = et+t+t, the manager is paid xt(^t 1; ^t; t 1; t)
and is then either retained or replaced according to the decision t(^
t 1
; ^t):
By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms for which (i) a truthful
and obedient strategy is optimal for the manager, and (ii) after any truthful and obedient history,
the manager nds it optimal to stay in the relationship whenever o¤ered the possibility of doing so
(i.e., the manager never nds it optimal to leave the rm when he has the option to stay). In the
language of dynamic mechanism design, the rst property means that the mechanism is "incentive
compatible" while the second property means that it is "sequentially individually rational".
Remark: While we are not imposing limited liability (or cash) constraints on the principals
problem, the e¤ort and retention policies that we characterize below turn out to be implementable
with non-negative payments for reasonable parameter specications (see Corollary 1 below).
3 The e¢ cient contract
We begin by describing the e¤ort and turnover policies E and E that maximize ex-ante welfare,
dened to be the sum of a representative managers expected payo¤ and of the rms expected prots
(the e¢ cientpolicies). Although we are clearly interested in characterizing these policies for the
same environment as described above, it turns out that these policies coincide with the ones that
maximize ex-ante welfare in an environment with symmetric information, in which the managers
productivities and e¤ort choices are observable and veriable. In turn, because all playerspayo¤s
are linear in payments, these policies also coincide with the ones that the rm would choose under
34For expositional convenience, we allow the policies t; xt; and t to be dened over all possible histories, including
those histories that lead to separation at some s < t: This, of course, is inconsequential for the analysis.
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symmetric information to maximize expected prots. For simplicity, in this section, we thus assume
information is symmetric and then show in Section 5  Proposition 7  that the e¢ cient policies
under symmetric information remain implementable also under asymmetric information.
The e¢ cient e¤ort policy is very simple: Because all players are risk neutral and because each
managers productivity has no e¤ect on the marginal cost or the marginal benet of e¤ort, the
e¢ cient e¤ort level eE is independent of the history of realized productivities and implicitly dened
by the rst-order condition  0(eE) = 1.
The e¢ cient turnover policy, on the other hand, is the solution to a dynamic programming
problem. Because the rm does not know the future productivity of its current manager, nor the
productivities of its future hires, this problem involves a trade-o¤ in each period between experi-
menting with a new manager and continuing experimenting with the incumbent. Denote by BE the
set of all bounded functions from  to R. The solution to the aforementioned trade-o¤ can be
represented as a value function WE 2 BE that, for any  2 , and irrespective of t, gives the rms
expected continuation payo¤ when the incumbent managers productivity is .35 Clearly, the value
WE() takes into account the possibility of replacing the manager in the future. As we show in the
Appendix, the function WE is the unique xed point to the mapping TE : BE ! BE dened, for all
W 2 BE , all  2 , by36
TEW () =  + e
E    (eE)  (1  )Uo + maxfE~j[W (~)];E~1 [W (~1)]g:
The e¢ cient contract can then be described as follows.
Proposition 1 The e¢ cient e¤ort and turnover policies satisfy the following properties.37 (i) For
all t; all t 2 t, Et (t) = eE ; with eE implicitly dened by  0(eE) = 1. (ii) Conditional on being
employed in period t; the manager is retained at the end of period t if and only if t  E ;where
E = inff 2  : E~j[WE(~)]  E~1 [WE(~1)]g:
The proof uses the Contraction Mapping Theorem to establish existence and uniqueness of a
function WE that is a xed point to the mapping TE : BE ! BE dened above. It then shows that
this function is indeed the value function for the problem described above. Finally, it establishes that
the function WE is nondecreasing. These properties, together with the assumptions that the process
is Markov, autonomous, and with kernels that can be ranked according to rst-order stochastic
dominance, imply that turnover decisions must be taken according to the cut-o¤ rule given in the
proposition.
35Note that if the process were not autonomous, the e¢ cient retention decision would obviously depend also on the
length t of the employment relationship. See the working paper version of the manuscript Garrett and Pavan (2011a)
for how the result in the next proposition must be adapted to accomodate non-autonomous processes.
36The expectations E~j[W (~)] and E~1 [W (
~1)] are, respectively, under the measures F (j) and F1()  recall that,
under the simplifying assumption that the process is autonomous, for any t > 1; any  2 ; Ft(j) = F (j):
37The e¢ cient policies are "essentially unique", i.e., unique up to a zero-measure set of histories.
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4 The prot-maximizing contract
We now turn to the contract that maximizes the rms expected prots in a setting where neither the
managersproductivities nor their e¤ort choices are observable. As anticipated above, what prevents
the rm from appropriating the entire surplus (equivalently, from "selling out" the project to the
managers) is the fact that, both at the initial contracting stage, as well as at any subsequent period,
each manager is privately informed about his productivity. To extract some of the surplus from the
most productive types, the rm must then introduce distortions in e¤ort and retention decisions,
which require retaining ownership of the project.
We start by showing that, in any incentive-compatible mechanism 
  h; x; i, each types
intertemporal expected payo¤ under a truthful and obedient strategy V 
(1) must satisfy
V 
 (1) = V

 () +
Z 1

E~1>1js
X(s;~1>1)
t=1
t 1J t1(s; ~
t
>1) 
0(t(s; ~
t
>1))

ds. (4)
The derivation of this formula follows from arguments similar to those in Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka (2012), adapted to the environment under examination here. To establish (4), consider the
following ctitious environment where the manager can misrepresent his type but is then forcedto
choose e¤ort so as to hide his lies by inducing the same distribution of cash ows as if his reported
type coincided with the true one. This is to say that, at any period t, given the history of reports ^
t
and the true current productivity t, the manager must choose e¤ort
e#t (t; ^
t
) = ^t + t(^
t
)  t: (5)
so that the distribution of the period-t cash ows is the same as when the managers true period-t
productivity is ^t and the manager follows the recommended e¤ort choice t(^
t
):
Clearly, if the mechanism 
 is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational in the
original environment where the manager is free to choose his e¤ort after misreporting his type, it
must also be in this ctitious one, where he is forced to choose e¤ort according to (5). This allows
us to focus on a necessary condition for the optimality of truthful reporting by the manager in the
ctitious environment which remains necessary for such behavior in the original one.
Fix an arbitrary sequence of reports ^
1
and an arbitrary sequence of true productivities 1. Let
C(^
1
) denote the present value of the stream of payments that the manager expects to receive from
the principal when the sequence of reported productivities is ^
1
and, in each period, he chooses e¤ort
according to (5).38 For any (1; ^
1
), the managers expected payo¤ in this ctitious environment is
38Note that, by construction, C does not depend on the true productivities 1: Also note that the expectation here
is over the transitory noise v1:
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given by
U(1; ^1)  C(^1) 
1X
t=1
t 1t 1(^
t 1
) (^t + t(^
t
)  t)
+
1X
t=1
t 1

1  t 1(^t 1)

(1  )Uo.
The assumption that  is di¤erentiable and Lipschitz continuous implies that U is totally di¤eren-
tiable in t, any t, and equi-Lipschitz continuous in 1 in the norm
jj1jj 
1X
t=1
tjtj:
Together with the fact that jj1jj is nite (which is implied by the assumption that  is bounded)
and that the impulse responses J ts(
t) are uniformly bounded, this means that the dynamic envelope
theorem of Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2012) (Proposition 3) applies to this environment. Hence, a
necessary condition for truthful reporting to be optimal for the manager in this ctitious environment
(and by implication also in the original one) is that the value function V 
(1) associated to the
problem that involves choosing the reports and then selecting e¤ort according to (5) is Lipschitz
continuous and, at each point of di¤erentiability, satises
dV 
(1)
d1
= E~1>1j1
"X1
t=1
t 1J t1(1; ~
t
>1)
@U(~1; ~1)
@t
#
,
where @U(1; 1)=@t denotes the partial derivative of U(1; 1) with respect to the true (rather
than the reported) type t. The result then follows from the fact that
@U(1; 1)
@t
= t 1(t 1) 0(t(
t))
and the denition of the stopping time  (1)  mint : t  t = 0	 :
The formula in (4) conrms the intuition that the expected surplus that the principal must leave
to each period-1 type is determined by the dynamics of e¤ort and retention decisions under the
contracts o¤ered to the less productive types. As anticipated in the Introduction, this is because
those managers who are most productive at the contracting stage expect to be able to obtain a "rent"
when mimicking the less productive types. This rent originates from the possibility of generating
the same cash ows as the less productive types by working less, thus economizing on the disutility
of e¤ort. The amount of e¤ort they expect to save must, however, take into account the fact that
their own productivity, as well as that of the types they are mimicking, will change over time. This
is done by weighting the amount of e¤ort saved in all subsequent periods by the impulse response
functions J t1, which, as explained above, control for how the e¤ect of the initial productivity on future
productivity evolves over time.
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Now let
(1)  1  F1 (1)
f1(1)
denote the inverse hazard rate of the rst-period distribution. Then (4) gives the following useful
result (the proof follows from the arguments above).
Proposition 2 In any incentive-compatible and sequentially individually rational mechanism 
 
h; x; i, the rms expected prots from each manager it hires are given by
E~1;~1
264(~
1
)X
t=1
t 1
(
~t + t(
~
t
) + ~t    (t(~
t
))
 (~1)J t1(~
t
) 0(t(~
t
))  (1  )Uo
)375+ Uo   V 
 () , (6)
where V 
 ()  Uo denotes the expected payo¤ of the lowest period-1 type.
The formula in (6) is the dynamic analog of the familiar virtual surplus formula for static adverse
selection settings. It expresses the rms expected prots as the discounted expected total surplus
generated by the relationship, net of terms that control for the surplus that the rm must leave
to the manager to induce him to participate in the mechanism and to truthfully reveal his private
information.
Equipped with the aforementioned representation, we now consider a relaxed program that
involves choosing the policies (t(); t())1t=1 so as to maximize the expected total payo¤ of the rm,
taking the contribution of each manager to be (6) (note that this incorporates only the local incentive
constraints) and subject to the participation constraints of the lowest period-1 types V 
 ()  Uo.
Below, we rst characterize the policies (t (); t ())1t=1 that solve the relaxed program. We then
provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a compensation scheme x such that the mechanism

  h; x; i is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational (and hence prot
maximizing for the rm).
Let A = [1t=1t and denote by B the set of bounded functions from A to R: For any e¤ort policy
, let W  denote the unique xed point to the mapping T () : B ! B dened, for all W 2 B, all t;
all t, by
T ()W
 
t
  t(t) + t    (t(t))  (1)J t1(t) 0(t(t)) (7)
  (1  )Uo + maxfE~t+1jt [W (~
t+1
)];E~1 [W (
~1)]g:
Proposition 3 Let  be the e¤ort policy implicitly dened, for all t; all t 2 t, by39
 0(t (
t)) = 1  (1)J t1(t) 00(t (t)) (8)
39For simplicity, we assume throughout that the prot-maximizing policy species positive e¤ort choices in each
period t and for each history t 2 t. This amounts to assuming that, for all t all t 2 t,  00 (0) < 1=  (1) Jt1  t.
When this condition does not hold, optimal e¤ort is simply given by t (
t) = 0:
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and (suppressing the dependence on  to ease the exposition) let W  be the unique xed point to
the mapping T () dened by (7). Let  denote the retention policy such that, for any t and any
t 2 t; conditional on the manager being employed in period t; he is retained at the end of period t
if and only if E~t+1jt [W
(~
t+1
)]  E~1 [W (~1)]: The pair of policies (; ) solves the rms relaxed
program.
The e¤ort and turnover policies that solve the relaxed program are thus the virtual analogs
of the policies E and E that maximize e¢ ciency, as given in Proposition 1. Note that, in each
period t; and for each history t 2 t, the optimal e¤ort t
 
t

is chosen so as to trade o¤ the
e¤ect of a marginal variation in e¤ort on total surplus et + t    (et)   (1  )Uo with its e¤ect
on the managersinformational rents, as computed from period ones perspective (i.e., at the time
the managers are hired). The fact that both the rms and the managerspreferences are additively
separable over time implies that this trade-o¤ is una¤ected by the possibility that the rm replaces
the managers. Furthermore, because each type 1s rent V 
 (1) is increasing in the e¤ort t(
0
1; 
t
>1)
that the rm asks each less productive type 01 < 1 in each period t  1, the optimal e¤ort policy
is downward distorted relative to its e¢ cient counterpart E ; as in La¤ont and Tiroles (1986) static
model.
More interestingly, note that, xing the initial type 1, the dynamics of e¤ort in subsequent
periods is entirely driven by the dynamics of the impulse response functions J t1: These functions,
by describing the e¤ect of period-one productivity on subsequent productivity, capture how the
persistence of the managersinitial private information evolves over time. Because such persistence
is what makes more productive (period-one) types expect larger surplus in subsequent periods than
initially less productive types, the dynamics of the impulse responses J t1 are what determine the
dynamics of e¤ort decisions t .
Next, consider the turnover policy. The characterization of the prot-maximizing policy 
parallels the one for the e¢ cient policy E in Proposition 1. The proof in the Appendix rst
establishes that the (unique) xed point W  to the mapping T () given by (7) coincides with
the value function associated with the problem that involves choosing the turnover policy so as to
maximize the expected total virtual surplus (given for each manager by (6)) taking as given the
prot-maximizing e¤ort policy . It then uses W  to derive the optimal retention policy.
For any t; any t 2 t,W   t gives the rms expected continuation prots (under all its future
hires) when the incumbent manager has worked already for t  1 periods and will continue working
for at least one more period (period t). As with the e¢ cient policy, this value is computed taking
into account future retention and e¤ort decisions. However, contrary to the case of e¢ ciency, the
value W 
 
t

in general depends on the entire history of productivities t, as opposed to only the
current productivity t. The reason is twofold. First, as shown above, the prot-maximizing e¤ort
policy typically depends on the entire history t: Second, even if e¤ort were exogenously xed at a
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constant level, because productivity is serially correlated, conditioning the current retention decision
on past productivity reports in addition to the current report is helpful in inducing the manager to
have been truthful at the time he made those past reports.
The prot-maximizing turnover policy can then be determined straightforwardly from the value
function W : each incumbent manager is replaced whenever the expected value E~1
h
W (~1)
i
of
starting a relationship with a new manager of unknown productivity exceeds the expected value
E~t+1jt
h
W (~
t+1
)
i
of continuing the relationship with the incumbent. Once again, these values are
calculated from the perspective of the time at which the incumbent is hired and take into account
the optimality of future e¤ort and retention decisions.
Having characterized the policies that solve the relaxed program, we now turn to su¢ cient
conditions that guarantee that such policies are indeed implemented under any optimal contract for
the rm in other words, solve the rms full program (recall that (6) only incorporates local IC
conditions, as implied by the envelope formula (4)).
We establish the result by showing existence of a compensation scheme x that implements the
policies (; ) at minimal cost for the rm. In particular, given the mechanism 
 = (; x; ); the
following properties hold true: (i) after any history ht = (t; ^
t 1
; et 1; t 1) such that t 1(^
t 1
) = 1;
each manager prefers to follow a truthful and obedient strategy in the entire continuation game
that starts in period t with history ht than following any other strategy; (ii) the lowest period-1
types expected payo¤ V 
 () from following a truthful and obedient strategy in the entire game is
exactly equal to his outside option Uo; and (iii) after any history ht = (t; ^
t 1
; et 1; t 1) such that
t 1(^
t 1
) = 1; each managers continuation payo¤ under a truthful and obedient strategy remains
at least as high as his outside option Uo: That the mechanism 
 is optimal for the rm then follows
from the fact that the mechanism is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational, along
with the results in Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the policies (; ) dened in Proposition 3 satisfy the following single-
crossing conditions for all t  1; all t; ^t 2 t, all ^t 1 2 t 1 such that t 1(^t 1) = 1:
E
~
1
>tjt
264 P(^
t 1
;t;~
1
>t)
k=t 
k tJkt (t; ~
k
>t) 
0

k(^
t 1
; t; ~
k
>t)

 P(^t 1;^t;~1>t)k=t k tJkt (t; ~k>t) 0 k(^t 1; ^t; ~k>t)
375 [t   ^t]  0: (9)
Then there exists a linear reward scheme of the form
xt (
t; t) = St(
t) + t(
t)t all t; all t 2 t, (10)
where St(t) and t(t) are scalars that depend on the history of reported productivities, such that, ir-
respective of the distribution  of the (zero-mean) transitory noise, the mechanism 
 = (; x; ) is
incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational and maximizes the rms prots. Further-
more, any contract that is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational and maximizes
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the rms prots implements the policies (; ) with probability one (i.e., except over a zero-measure
set of histories).
The single-crossing conditions in the proposition say that higher reports about current produc-
tivity lead, on average, to higher chances of retention and to higher e¤ort choices both in the present
as well as in subsequent periods, where the average is over future histories, weighted by the impulse
responses: These conditions are trivially satised when the e¤ort and retention policies are strongly
monotone, i.e., when each t () and t () is nondecreasing in t.40 More generally, the conditions in
the propositions only require that the expected sum of marginal disutilities of e¤ort, conditional on
retention and weighted by the impulse responses, changes sign only once when the manager changes
his report about current productivity.
Turning to the components of the linear scheme, the coe¢ cients t are chosen so as to provide
the manager with the right incentives to choose e¤ort obediently. Because neither future cash ows
nor future retention decisions depend on current cash ows (and, as a result, on current e¤ort), it
is easy to see that, when the sensitivity of the managers compensation to the current cash ows is
given by t =  0(t (
t)), by choosing e¤ort et = t(
t), the manager equates the marginal disutility
of e¤ort to its marginal benet and hence maximizes his continuation payo¤. This is irrespective of
whether or not the manager has reported his productivity truthfully. Under the proposed scheme,
the moral-hazard part of the problem is thus controlled entirely through the variable components t.
Given t, the xed components St are then chosen to control for the adverse-selection part of the
problem, i.e., to induce the managers to reveal their productivity. As we show in the Appendix, when
the policies  and  satisfy the single-crossing conditions in the proposition, then considering the two
components  and S together, the following property holds: In the continuation game that starts
with any arbitrary history ht = (t; ^
t 1
; et 1; t 1), irrespective of whether or not the manager
has been truthful in the past, he nds one-stage deviations from the truthful and obedient strategy
unprotable. Together with a certain property of continuity-at-innity discussed in the Appendix,
this result in turn implies that no other deviations are protable either.
In a moment, we turn to primitive conditions that guarantee that the policies (; ) of Propo-
sition 3 satisfy the single crossing conditions of Proposition 4. Before doing so, we notice that,
under reasonable conditions, the linear schemes of Proposition 4 entail a nonnegative payment to
the manager in every period and for any history. We conclude that neither our positive nor our nor-
mative results below depend critically on our simplifying assumption of disregarding limited liability
(or cash) constraints.
Corollary 1 When (i) the lower bound v on the transitory noise shocks  is not too small (i.e.,
not too large in absolute value), (ii) the level of the outside option Uo is not too small, and (iii) the
40The expression "strongly monotone" is used in the dynamic mechanism design literature to di¤erentiate this form
of monotonicity from other weaker notions (see, e.g., Courty and Li (2000) and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012)).
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discount factor  is not too high, the linear schemes of Proposition 4 can be chosen so as to entail
a nonnegative payment to the manager in every period and for any history. Under these additional
assumptions, the corresponding mechanism 
 = (; x; ) remains optimal also in settings where
the managers are protected by limited liability.
We now turn to primitive conditions that guarantee that the policies (; ) that solve the
relaxed program satisfy the conditions of Proposition 4 and hence are sustained under any optimal
mechanism.
Proposition 5 A su¢ cient condition for the policies (; ) of Proposition 3 to satisfy the single-
crossing conditions of Proposition 4 (and hence to be part of an optimal mechanism) is that, for
each t, the function ()J t1 () is nonincreasing on t.41 When this is the case, the optimal retention
policy takes the form of a cut-o¤ rule: There exists a sequence of nonincreasing threshold functions
(t ())1t=1, t : t 1 ! R; all t  1;42 such that, conditional on being employed in period t; the
manager is retained at the end of period t if and only if t  t
 
t 1

. Furthermore, under the
above conditions, in each period t  1, the optimal e¤ort policy t () is nondecreasing in the reported
productivities.
Note that the monotonicity condition in the proposition guarantees that each t (
t) is nonde-
creasing, which is used to guarantee implementability in linear schemes. It also guarantees that the
ow virtual surplus
V St
 
t
  t  t+ t    (t (t))  (1)J t1  t 0(t (t))  (1  )Uo (11)
that the rm expects from each incumbent during the t-th period of employment is nondecreasing in
the history of productivities t. Together with the condition of rst-order stochastic dominance in
types (which implies that impulse responses are non-negative), this property in turn implies that
the value W (t) of continuing the relationship after t periods is nondecreasing. In this case, the
turnover policy  that maximizes the rms virtual surplus is also nondecreasing and takes the form
of a simple cut-o¤ rule, with cut-o¤ functions (t ())1t=1 satisfying the properties in the proposition.
We are now ready to establish our key positive result. We start with the following denition.
Denition 1 The kernels F satisfy the property of declining impulse responses if, for any
t > s  1, any (s; t>s); t  s implies that J t1(s; t>s)  Js1(s):
41With bounded noise v, the monotonicity condition in the proposition can be replaced by the weaker condition that
t   (1)Jt1(t) be nondecreasing in t; for all t. Under this condition, the policies (; ) remain implementable
(albeit not necessarily with linear schemes), and the results in the proposition continue to hold. The same is true for
some, but not all, unbounded noise distributions.
42The cuto¤ 1 is a scalar.
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As anticipated in the Introduction, this property captures the idea that the e¤ect of a managers
initial productivity on his future productivity declines with the length of the employment relationship,
a property that seems reasonable for many cases of interest. This property is satised, for example,
by an autonomous AR(1) process t = t 1 +"t with coe¢ cient  of linear dependence smaller than
one.
We then have the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose that, for each t, the function ()J t1 () is nonincreasing on t. Suppose in
addition that the kernels F satisfy the property of declining impulse responses. Take an arbitrary
period t  1 and any t 2 t such that t 1
 
t 1

= 1: If t is such that t  s for some s < t,
then t
 
t

= 1.
In words, when separation occurs, it must necessarily be the case that the managers productivity
is at its historical lowest. Along with the result in Proposition 5 that the threshold functions t ()
are nonincreasing, this result implies that the productivity level that the rm requires for retention
declines with the length of the employment relationship.43 The reason why the retention policy
becomes gradually more permissive over time is the one anticipated in the Introduction. Suppose
that the e¤ect of the initial productivity on future productivity declines over time and consider a
manager whose initial type is 1. A commitment to replace this manager in the distant future is less
e¤ective in reducing the informational rent that the rm must leave to each more productive type
01 > 1 than a commitment to replace him in the near future (for given productivity at the time
of dismissal). Formally, for any given productivity  2 , the net ow payo¤ that the rm expects
(ex-ante) from retaining the incumbent in period t, as captured by (11), increases with the length of
the employment relationship, implying that the value function W  increases as well.
Remark 1 Note that, while the result in Proposition 6 is reinforced by the fact that, under the
optimal contract, e¤ort increases over time, it is not driven by this property. The same result would
hold if the level of e¤ort that the rm asks of the manager were exogenously xed at some constant
level e^:
The result that the optimal turnover policy becomes more permissive over time, together with
the result that the productivity level t (
t 1) required for retention decreases with the productivity
experienced in past periods, may help explain the practice of rewarding managers that are highly
productive at the early stages (and hence, on average, generate higher prots) by o¤ering them job
43That is, the threshold functions (t ())1t=1 that describe the optimal retention policy must satisfy the following
property: for any t  1; any t = (s)ts=1 with s  s(s 1) all s  t, necessarily t+1(t)  t (t 1): Note that this
also implies that there exists a nondecreasing sequence of scalars (#t )
1
t=1 such that a manager is retained in period 1
if and only if 1  #1 and, for any t  2; no manager whose period-t productivity is above #t is red in period t (this
can be seen by letting #t = maxft (t 1) : t 1 satises s  s(s 1) all s  t  1g):
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stability once their tenure in the rm becomes long enough. Thus, what in the eyes of an external
observer may look like "entrenchment" can actually be the result of a prot-maximizing contract
in a world where managerial productivity is expected to change over time and to be the managers
private information. Importantly, note that this property holds independently of the level of the
managersoutside option Uo: We thus expect such a property to hold irrespective of whether one
looks at a given rm or at the entire market equilibrium.
It is, however, important to recognize that, while the property that retention decisions become
more permissive over time holds when conditioning on productivity (equivalently, on match quality),
it need not hold when averaging across the entire pool of productivities of retained managers. Indeed,
while the probability of retention for a given productivity level necessarily increases with tenure,
the unconditional probability of retention need not be monotonic in the length of the employment
relationship because of composition e¤ects that can push in the opposite direction. It is thus essential
for the econometrician testing for our positive prediction to collect data that either directly, or
indirectly, permit him to condition on managerial productivity.
5 On the (in)e¢ ciency of prot-maximizing retention decisions
We now turn to the normative implications of the result that prot-maximizing retention policies
become more permissive with time. We start by establishing that the rst-best e¤ort and turnover
policies of Proposition 1 remain implementable also when productivity and e¤ort choices are the
managersprivate information.
Proposition 7 Assume that both productivity and e¤ort choices are the managersprivate informa-
tion. There exists a linear compensation scheme of the type described in Proposition 4 that imple-
ments the rst-best e¤ort and turnover policies of Proposition 1.
We can now compare the rms prot-maximizing policies with their e¢ cient counterparts. As
shown in the previous section, when impulse responses decline over time and eventually vanish in
the long run, e¤ort under the rms optimal contract gradually converges to its e¢ cient level as
the length of the employment relationship grows su¢ ciently large. One might expect a similar
convergence result to apply also to retention decisions. This conjecture, however, fails to take into
account that the rms endogenous separation payo¤ (that is, the payo¤ that the rm expects from
going back to the labor market and o¤ering the prot-maximizing contract to each new manager) is
lower than the planners endogenous separation payo¤ (that is, the surplus that the planner expects
by forcing the rm to go back to the labor market and o¤er the welfare-maximizing contract to each
new manager). Taking this into account one can then show that, once the length of the employment
relationship has grown su¢ ciently large, prot-maximizing retention decisions become excessively
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Figure 1: Relation between retention thresholds and impulse responses
permissive as compared to what e¢ ciency requires. We formalize this result in Proposition 8 below.
Before doing that, as a preliminary step towards understanding the result, we consider a simplied
example.44
Example 1 Consider a rm operating for only two periods and assume that this is commonly known.
In addition, suppose that both 1 and "2 are uniformly distributed over [ :5;+:5] and that 2 = 1 +
"2. Finally, suppose that  (e) = e2=2 for all e 2 [0; 1], and that Uo = 0. In this example, the prot-
maximizing contract induces too much (respectively, too little) turnover if  > 0:845 (respectively, if
 < 0:845), where J21 =  is the impulse response of 2 to 1:
The relation between the prot-maximizing thresholds 1 and the impulse response  of 2 to
1 is depicted in Figure 1 below (the e¢ cient threshold is E = 0).
The example indicates that whether the prot-maximizing threshold for retention is higher or
lower than its e¢ cient counterpart depends crucially on the magnitude of the impulse response of
2 to 1: When  is small, the e¤ect of 1 on 2 is small, in which case the rm can appropriate
a large fraction of the surplus generated by the incumbent in the second period. As a result, the
rm optimally commits in period one to retain the incumbent for a large set of his period-one
productivities. In particular, when  is very small (i.e., when 1 and 2 are close to be independent)
the rm optimally commits to retain the incumbent irrespective of his period-one productivity. Such
a low turnover is clearly ine¢ cient, for e¢ ciency requires that the incumbent be retained only when
his expected period-2 productivity is higher than that of a newly hired manager, which is the case
only when 1  E = 0:
On the other hand, when  is close to 1, the threshold productivity for retention under the prot-
maximizing policy is higher than the e¢ cient one. To see why, suppose that productivity is fully
44The reader may notice that this example fails to satisfy the assumption that each kernel has the same support.
However, recall that such assumption was made only to simplify the exposition. All our results extend to processes with
shifting supports, as well as to non-autonomous processes (see the working-paper version of the manuscript, Garrett
and Pavan, 2011a).
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persistent, i.e. that  = 1. Then, as is readily checked, V S1 (1) = E~2j1
h
V S2

1; ~2
i
, where the
virtual surplus functions V S1 and V S2 are given by (11). In this example, V S1 is strictly convex.
Noting that E = E
h
~1
i
, we then have that E
h
V S1

~1
i
> V S1
 
E

= E~2jE
h
V S2

E ; ~2
i
,
i.e., the expected value of replacing the incumbent is greater than the value from keeping him when
his rst-period productivity equals the e¢ cient threshold. The same result holds for  close to 1.
When productivity is highly persistent, the rms optimal contract may thus induce excessive ring
(equivalently, too high a level of turnover) as compared to what is e¢ cient.
As shown below, the above comparative statics have a natural analog in a dynamic setting
by replacing the degree of serial correlation  in the example with the length of the employment
relationship. We start with the following denition.
Denition 2 The kernels F satisfy the property of vanishing impulse responses if, for any
 > 0, there exists t such that, for all t > t, (1)J t1(
t) <  for all t 2 t.
This condition simply says that the e¤ect of the managersinitial productivity on their subsequent
productivity eventually vanishes after su¢ ciently long tenure, and that this occurs uniformly over
all histories.
Next, we introduce an additional technical condition that plays no substantial role but permits
us to state our key normative result in the cleanest possible manner.
Condition LC [Lipschitz Continuity]: There exists a constant  2 R++ such that, for each
t  2, each 1 2 , the function (1)J t1((1; )) is Lipschitz continuous over t 1 with Lipschitz
constant ; and (b) there exists a constant  2 R++ such that, for  2 , the function f (j) is
Lipschitz continuous over  with constant :
We then have the following result (the result in this proposition, as well as the result in Corollary
2 below, refer to the interesting case where E 2 intfg).
Proposition 8 (i) Suppose that, for each t, the function ()J t1 () is nonincreasing on t. Suppose
also that the kernels F satisfy the property of vanishing impulse responses. There exists t 2 N such
that, for any t > t and any t 2 t for which t  E, E~t+1jt [W (~
t+1
)] > E~1 [W
(~1)]. (ii)
Suppose, in addition, that F satises the properties of Condition LC. Then there exists t 2 N such
that, for any t > t, any t 1 2 t 1 for which t 1(t 1) = 1, t (t 1) < E.
Part (i) of Proposition 8 establishes existence of a critical length t for the employment relationship
after which retention is excessive under the prot-maximizing contract. For any t > t, any t 2 t,
if the manager is retained at the end of period t under the e¢ cient contract, he is also retained under
the prot-maximizing contract. Condition LC implies continuity in t of the expected continuation
payo¤s E~t+1j(t 1;)[W
(~
t+1
)] and E~j[W
E(~)] for any period t  2 and history of productivities
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t 1 2 t 1. This in turn establishes that the prot-maximizing retention thresholds will eventually
become strictly smaller than their e¢ cient counterparts (as stated by Part (ii)).
The proof for Proposition 8 can be understood heuristically by considering the ctitious prob-
lemthat involves maximizing the rms expected prots in a setting where the rm can observe its
incumbent managers types and e¤ort choices, but not those of its future hires. In this environment,
the rm optimally asks the incumbent to follow the e¢ cient e¤ort policy in each period, it extracts
all surplus from the incumbent (i.e., the incumbent receives a payo¤ equal to his outside option),
and o¤ers the contract identied in Proposition 3 to each new hire.
Now, consider the actual problem. After a su¢ ciently long tenure, the cuto¤s for retaining the
incumbent in this problem must converge to those in the ctitious problem. The reason is that, after
a su¢ ciently long tenure, distorting e¤ort and retention decisions has almost no e¤ect on the ex-ante
surplus that the rm must leave to the incumbent. Together with the fact that the rms outside
option(i.e., its expected payo¤ from hiring a new manager) is the same in the two problems, this
implies that the rms decision on whether or not to retain the incumbent must eventually coincide
in the two problems.
Next, note that the rms outside option in the ctitious problem is strictly lower than the
rms outside option in a setting where the rm can observe all managerstypes and e¤ort choices.
The reason is that, with asymmetric information, it is impossible for the rm to implement the
e¢ cient policies while extracting all surplus from the managers, whilst this is possible with symmetric
information. It follows that, after a su¢ ciently long tenure, the value that the rm assigns to retaining
the incumbent relative to hiring a new manager is necessarily higher in the ctitious problem (and
therefore in the actual one) than in a setting with symmetric information: the prot that the rm
obtains under the incumbents control is the same, while the payo¤ from hiring a new manager is
lower. Furthermore, because the value that the rm assigns to retaining the incumbent (relative to
hiring a new manager) in a setting with symmetric information coincides with the one assigned by
the planner when maximizing welfare,45 we have that the rms retention policy necessarily becomes
more permissive than the e¢ cient one after su¢ ciently long tenure.
The ndings of Propositions 6 and 8 can be combined together to establish the following corollary,
which contains our key normative result. (The result refers to the interesting case in which the
prot-maximizing policy retains each manager after the rst period with positive probability, that
is, 1 < ).
Corollary 2 Suppose that, in addition to satisfying the property that, for each t, the function
()J t1 () is nonincreasing on t, the kernels F satisfy both the properties of declining and van-
45Recall that welfare under the e¢ cient contract with asymmetric information coincides with the sum of the rms
expected prots and of all the managersoutside options under the contract that the rm would o¤er if information
about all managerse¤ort and productivities were symmetric.
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ishing impulse responses. Then, relative to what is e¢ cient, the prot-maximizing contract either
induces excessive retention (i.e., too little turnover) throughout the entire relationship, or excessive
ring at the early stages followed by excessive retention in the long run. Formally, there exist dates
t; t 2 N, with 1  t  t, such that (a) for any t < t, and almost any t 2 t, if Et 1(t 1) = 1 and
Et (
t) = 0, then t (
t) = 0, and that (b) for any t > t; and almost any t 2 t, if t 1(t 1) = 1
and t (
t) = 0, then Et (
t) = 0.
Hence, any manager who is red at the end of period t < t under the e¢ cient policy is either
red at the end of the same period or earlier under the prot-maximizing contract, whereas any
manager red at the end of period t > t under the prot-maximizing contract is either red at the
end of the same period or earlier under the e¢ cient policy.
6 Conclusions
We developed a tractable, yet rich, model of dynamic managerial contracting that explicitly accounts
for the following possibilities: (i) turnover is driven by variations in the managersability to generate
prots for the rm (equivalently, in the match quality); (ii) variations in managerial productivity are
anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers; (iii) at each point in
time, the rm can go back to the labor market and replace an incumbent manager with a new hire;
(iv) the rms prospects under the new hire are a¤ected by the same information frictions as in the
relationship with each incumbent.
Allowing for the aforementioned possibilities permitted us to identify important properties of the
employment relationship. On the positive side, we showed that prot-maximizing contracts require
job instability early in the relationship followed by job security later on. These dynamics balance
the rms concern for responding promptly to variations in the environment that call for a change
in management with its concern for limiting the level of managerial compensation that is necessary
to induce a truthful exchange of information between the management and the board. What in the
eyes of an external observer may thus look like "entrenchment" driven by poor governance or lack
of commitment, can actually be the result of a fully optimal contract in a world where the boards
objectives are perfectly aligned with those of the shareholders. This result, however, does not mean
that rmsretention decisions are e¢ cient. We showed that the contracts that rms o¤er to their
top managers either induce excessive retention (i.e., insu¢ ciently low turnover) at all tenure levels,
or excessive ring at the early stages followed by excessive retention after long tenure.
Throughout the analysis, we maintained the assumption that the process that matches managers
to rms is exogenous. Endogenizing the matching process is an important, yet challenging, direction
for future research which is likely to shed further light on the joint dynamics of compensation,
performance, and retention decisions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. That the e¢ cient e¤ort policy is given by Et (
t) = eE for all t, all t,
follows directly from inspection of the rms payo¤ (3), the managerspayo¤ (2), and the denition
of cash ows (1).
Consider the retention policy. Because all managers are ex-ante identical, and because the process
governing the evolution of the managersproductivities is Markov and autonomous, it is immediate
that, in each period, the decision of whether or not to retain a manager must depend only on the
managers current productivity : We will denote by WE :  ! R the value function associated
with the problem that involves choosing the e¢ cient Markovian retention policy; given the constant
e¤ort policy described above. For any  2 ; WE () species the maximal continuation expected
welfare that can be achieved when the incumbent managers productivity is . It is immediate that
WE is the value function of the problem described above only if it is a xed point to the mapping
TE dened in the main text:
Now let NE  BE denote the space of bounded functions from  to R that are nondecreasing.
Below, we rst establish existence and uniqueness of a function W^E 2 NE such that TEW^E = W^E :
Next, we verify that WE = W^E :
Note that the set NE , together with the uniform metric, is a complete metric space. Because the
process satises the property of rst-order-stochastic dominance in past types, NE is closed under
TE . Moreover, Blackwells su¢ cient conditions(namely, monotonicityand discounting, where
the latter is guaranteed by the assumption that  < 1) imply that TE is a contraction. Therefore,
by the Contraction Mapping Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 3.2 of Stokey and Lucas, 1989), for any
W 2 NE , W^E = limn!1 TnEW exists, is unique, and belongs to NE .
Now, we claim that the following retention policy is e¢ cient: for any t; any t 2 t, t 1(t 1) =
1 implies t(t) = 1 if E~jt
h
W^E(~)
i
 E~1
h
W^E(~1)
i
and t(t) = 0 otherwise. Note that, because
the process satises the property of rst-order-stochastic dominance in past types, and because W^
is nondecreasing, this retention policy is a cut-o¤ policy. This property, together with the fact that
the ow payo¤s  + eE    (eE)   (1  )Uo and W^E are uniformly bounded on , then permit
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one to verify, via standard verication arguments, that the constructed policy is indeed e¢ cient and
that WE = W^E .46
Proof of Proposition 3. First, consider the e¤ort policy. It is easy to see that the policy 
that solves the relaxed program is independent of the retention policy  and is such that t (
t) is
given by (8) for all t; all t 2 t: Next, consider the retention policy. We rst prove existence of a
unique xed point W  2 B to the mapping T (). To this end, endow B with the uniform metric.
That B is closed under T () is ensured by the restrictions on  and by the denition of , which
together imply that each function V St : t ! R dened by
V St
 
t
  t  t+ t    (t (t))  (1)J t1  t 0(t (t))  (1  )Uo
is uniformly bounded over A. Blackwells theorem implies that T () is a contraction mapping and
the Contraction Mapping Theorem (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989) then implies the result. Standard
arguments then permit one to verify that W (t) is indeed the value function associated with the
problem that involves choosing a retention policy that, given the history of productivities t 2 t
for the incumbent manager and given the prot-maximizing e¤ort policy , maximizes the rms
expected total continuation prots.47 Having established this result, it is then easy to see that any
retention policy  that, given the e¤ort policy ; maximizes the rms total prots must satisfy
the conditions in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the linear reward scheme x = (xt : t R! R)1t=1 where
xt(
t; t) = St(
t) + t(
t)t for all t; with
t(
t)   0(t (t)) (12)
and
St(
t) =  (t (
t))  t(t)
 
t
 
t

+ t

+ (1  )Uo (13)
+
Z t

E
~
1
>tjs
24(t 1;s;~1>t)X
k=t
k tJkt (s; ~
k
>t) 
0(k(
t 1; s; ~
k
>t))
35 ds
 t
 
t

E~t+1jt
h
ut+1(~t+1; 
t)
i
where
ut+1(t+1; 
t) 
Z t+1

E~1>t+1js
24(t;s;~1>t+1)X
k=t+1
k (t+1)Jkt+1(s; ~
k
>t+1) 
0(k(
t; s; ~
k
>t+1))
35 ds (14)
46This verication is standard in dynamic programming and hence omitted for brevity.
47The reason why the term  (1  )Uo disappears from the mapping T () is that this term is constant across t and
across all managers.
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denotes the managers period-(t+1) continuation payo¤ (over and above his outside option) under
the truthful and obedient strategy.
Note that, because retention does not depend on cash ows, it does not a¤ect the managers
incentives for e¤ort. From the law of iterated expectations, it then follows that, for any given history
of reports ^
t 1
such that the manager is still employed in period t  1 (i.e., t 1(^
t 1
) = 1) and for
any period-t productivity t, the managers continuation payo¤ at the beginning of period t when
the manager plans to follow a truthful and obedient strategy from period t onwards is given by
Uo + ut(t; ^
t 1
) where48
ut(t; ^
t 1
) 
Z t

E~1>tjs
"X(^t 1;s;~1>t)
k=t
k tJkt (s; ~
k
>t) 
0(k(^
t 1
; s; ~
k
>t))
#
ds.
Because ut(t; ^
t 1
)  0, the above scheme guarantees that, after any truthful and obedient history,
the manager nds it optimal to stay in the relationship whenever the rms retention policy permits
him to do so.
Now, take an arbitrary history of past reports ^
t 1
. Suppose that, in period t, the managers
true type is t and that he reports ^t, then optimally chooses e¤ort t(^
t 1
; ^t) in period t, and then,
starting from period t+1 onwards, he follows a truthful and obedient strategy. One can easily verify
that, under the proposed linear scheme, the managers continuation payo¤ is then given by
u^t(t; ^t; ^
t 1
) = ut(^t; ^
t 1
) +  0(t (^
t 1
; ^t))[t   ^t]
+t (^t; ^
t 1
)
n
E~t+1jt [ut+1(
~t+1; ^
t 1
; ^t)]  E~t+1j^t [ut+1(~t+1; ^
t 1
; ^t)]
o
.
The single-crossing conditions in the proposition then imply that, for all t; all ^
t 1 2 t 1, all
t; ^t 2 t, "
dut(t; ^
t 1
)
dt
  @u^t(t; ^t; ^
t 1
)
@t
# h
t   ^t
i
 0.
One can easily verify that this condition in turn implies that following a truthful and obedient
strategy from period t onwards gives type t a higher continuation payo¤ than lying in period t by
reporting ^t, then optimally choosing e¤ort t(^
t 1
; ^t) in period t, and then going back to a truthful
and obedient strategy from period t+ 1 onwards.
Now, to establish the result in the proposition, it su¢ ces to compare the managers continuation
payo¤ at any period t, given any possible type t and any possible history of past reports ^
t 1 2 t 1
under a truthful and obedient strategy from period t onwards, with the managers expected payo¤
under any continuation strategy that satises the following property. In each period s  t, and after
any possible history of reports ^
s 2 s, the e¤ort specied by the strategy for period s coincides
48Note that, under the proposed scheme, a managers continuation payo¤ depends on past announcements ^
t 1
, but
not on past productivities t 1, e¤ort choices et 1; or cash ows t 1:
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with the one prescribed by the recommendation policy s; that is, after any sequence of reports ^
s
,
e¤ort is given by s(^
s
); where s(^
s
) is implicitly dened by
 0(s(^
s
)) = s(^
s
): (15)
Restricting attention to continuation strategies in which, at any period s  t, the manager follows
the recommended e¤ort policy s(^
s
) is justied by: (i) the fact that the compensation paid in each
period s  t is independent of past cash ows s 1; (ii) under the proposed scheme, the managers
period-s compensation, net of his disutility of e¤ort, is maximized at es = s(^
s
); (iii) cash ows
have no e¤ect on retention. Together, these properties imply that, given any continuation strategy
that prescribes e¤ort choices di¤erent from those implied by (15), there exists another continuation
strategy whose e¤ort choices comply with (15) for all s  t; all ^s; which gives the manager a (weakly)
higher expected continuation payo¤.
Next, it is easy to see that, under any continuation strategy that satises the aforementioned
e¤ort property, the managers expected payo¤ in each period s  t is bounded uniformly over s.
In turn, this implies that a continuity-at-innity condition similar to that in Fudenberg and Levine
(1983) holds in this environment. Precisely, for any  > 0, there exists t large enough such that,
for all t 2 t, and all ^t 1; t 1 2 t 1; t
u^t(t; ^t 1)  ut(t; t 1) < , where u^t and ut are
continuation payo¤s under arbitrary continuation strategies satisfying the above e¤ort restriction,
given arbitrary histories of reports ^
t 1
and 
t 1
. This continuity-at-innity property, together with
the aforementioned property about one-stage deviations from a truthful and obedient strategy, imply
that, after any history, the managers continuation payo¤ under a truthful and obedient strategy
from that period onwards is weakly higher than the expected payo¤ under any other continuation
strategy. We thus conclude that, whenever the pair of policies (; ) satises all the single-crossing
conditions in the proposition, it can be implemented by the proposed linear reward scheme. That is,
the mechanism 
 = (; ; s) is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational.
That the mechanism 
 is optimal then follows from Proposition 2 by observing that, under 
;
type  obtains an expected payo¤ equal to his outside option, i.e., V 


() = Uo: The last claim in
the proposition that the policies (; ) are implemented under any mechanism that is optimal for
the rm then follows from the fact that such policies are the "essentially" unique policies that solve
the relaxed program, where essentially means up to a zero measure set of histories.
Proof of Corollary 1. The result follows from inspecting the terms St and t of the linear
scheme dened in the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. Assume that each function ht ()   ()J t1 () is nondecreas-
ing. Because the function g(e; h; )  e +     (e) + h 0 (e)   (1  )Uo has the strict increasing
di¤erences property with respect to e and h, each function t () is nondecreasing. This property
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follows from standard monotone comparative statics results by noting that, for each t; each t;
t (
t) = arg maxe2E g(e; ht
 
t

; t).
Next, we show that, for all t, the functionW (t) is nondecreasing. To this aim, letN  B denote
the set of all bounded functions from A  [1t=1t to R that, for each t; are nondecreasing in t: Note
that, since ()J t1 () is nondecreasing, so is the function V St()  this is an immediate implication of
the envelope theorem. This property, together with the fact that the process describing the evolution
of the managersproductivities satises the property of rst-order stochastic dominance in past types
implies that N is closed under the operator T (). It follows that limn!1 T ()nW is in N . The
fact that T () : B ! B admits a unique xed point then implies that limn!1 T ()nW = W .
The last result, together with rst-order stochastic dominance in typesimplies that, for each
t; each t 1 2 t 1; E~t+1j(t 1;)
h
W (~
t+1
)
i
is nondecreasing in t: Given the monotonicity of each
function E~t+1j(t 1;)
h
W (~
t+1
)
i
, it is then immediate that the retention policy  that maximizes
the rms prots must be a cut-o¤ rule with cut-o¤ functions (t ())1t=1 satisfying the conditions in
the proposition. A sequence of cut-o¤ functions (t ())1t=1 satisfying these conditions is, for example,
the following: for any t, any t 1 2 t 1;
t (
t 1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 if E~t+1jt [W
(~
t+1
)] > E~1 [W
(~1)] for all t 2 
 if E~t+1jt [W
(~
t+1
)] < E~1 [W
(~1)] for all t 2 
min
n
t 2  : E~t+1jt [W (~
t+1
)]  E~1 [W (~1)]
o
if
n
t 2  : E~t+1jt [W (~
t+1
)] = E~1 [W
(~1)]
o
6= ;
The property that each t () and t () are nondecreasing implies that the policy  and  satisfy
all the single-crossing conditions of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove the proposition by showing that, for any arbitrary pair
of periods s; t; with s < t, and an arbitrary history of productivities t =
 
s; t>s
 2 t, s  t
implies that E~t+1jt [W
(~
t+1
)]  E~s+1js [W (~
s+1
)].
Let N^ denote the subclass of all functions W 2 B satisfying the following properties: (a) for
each s, W (s) is non-decreasing over s; and (b) for any t > s, any s 2 s and any t such that
t =
 
s; t>s
 2 t, if s  t, then W (s) W  t.
We established already in the proof of Proposition 5 that the operator T () preserves property
(a). The property of declining impulse responses, together with the property of rst-order stochastic
dominance in past types, implies that T () also preserves (b). The unique xed point W  to the
mapping T () : B ! B thus satises properties (a) and (b) above. First-order stochastic dominance
in past types then implies that E~t+1jt [W
(~
t+1
)]  E~s+1js [W (~
s+1
)].
Proof of Proposition 7. The result follows from the same arguments as in the proof of
Proposition 4, by observing that the rst-best policies are nondecreasing.
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Proof of Example 1. Note that  (1) = 12   1. Thus, 1(1) = 12 + 1 and the payo¤
from hiring a new manager in period 2 is E
h
1(~1) + ~1    (1(~1))  (~1) 0(1(~1))
i
= 1=6. The
manager is thus retained if and only if E~2j1
h
2(1) + ~2    (2(1))  (1) 0(2(1))
i
 1=6,
where 2(1) = 1   2 + 1 and E~2j1
h
~2
i
= 1. The inequality holds for all 1 2
 12 ;+12 if
  0:242. Otherwise it holds if and only if 1  1 for some 1 2 ( 12 ;+12) such that 1 < 0 if
 2 (0:242; 0:845) and 1 > 0 if  > 0:845.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof follows from ve lemmas. Lemmas A1-A3 establish Part
(i) of the proposition. Lemmas A4 and A5, together with Part (i), establish Part (ii).
Part (i). We start with the following lemma which does not require any specic assumption
on the stochastic process and provides a useful property for a class of stopping problems with an
exogenous separation payo¤.
Lemma A1. For any c 2 R, there exists a unique function WE;c 2 BE that is a xed point to
the mapping TE;c : BE ! BE dened, for all W 2 BE , all  2 , by
TE;cW () =  + e
E    (eE)  (1  )Uo + max
n
E~j
h
W (~)
i
; c
o
.
Fix c0; c00 2 R with c00 > c0. There exists  > 0 such that, for all t; all  2 ,
E~j[W
E;c00(~)]  c00 =) E~j[WE;c
0
(~)] > c0 + :
Proof of Lemma A1. Take any c 2 R. Because BE , together with the uniform metric, is a
complete metric space, and because TE;c is a contraction, TE;c has a unique xed point WE;c 2 BE .
Now take a pair (c00; c0); with c00 > c0, and let C(c00; c0)  BE be the space of bounded functions from
 to R such that, for all  2 , W ()  WE;c00()   (c00   c0). First note that C(c00; c0) is closed
under TE;c0 . To see this, take any W 2 C(c00; c0). Then, for any  2 ;
TE;c0W () WE;c00() = TE;c0W ()  TE;c00WE;c00()
= 

maxfE~j[W (~)]; c0g  maxfE~j[WE;c
00
(~)]; c00g

  (c00   c0).
Also, once endowed with the uniform metric, C(c00; c0) is a complete metric space. Hence, from the
same arguments as in the proofs of the previous propositions, the unique xed point WE;c
0 2 BE to
the operator TE;c0 must be an element of C(c00; c0). That is, for all  2 , WE;c0()  WE;c00 () 
  (c00   c0).
Finally, for any t, any  2 , if E~j[WE;c
00
(~)]  c00, then
E~j[W
E;c0(~)]  E~j[WE;c
00
(~)]  (c00   c0)  c00   (c00   c0) > c0 + 
for some  > 0. 
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The next lemma establishes a strict ranking between the separation payo¤s under the e¢ cient
and the prot-maximizing contracts.
Lemma A2. E~1
h
WE(~1)
i
> E~1
h
W (~1)
i
.
Proof of Lemma A2. Let D(WE)  B be the space of bounded functionsW from A  [1t=1t
to R such that W (t)  WE(t) for all t; all t 2 t. The set D(WE) is closed under the operator
T (), as dened in Proposition 3. To see this, let W 2 D(WE). Then, for all t; all t 2 t,
T ()W (t) = t (
t) + t    (t (t))  (1)J t1(t) 0(t (t))
  (1  )Uo + maxfE~t+1jt [W (~
t
)];E~1 [W (
~1)]g
 eE + t    (eE)  (1  )Uo
+maxfE~jt [WE(~)];E~1 [WE(~1)]g
= TEW
E (t) = W
E (t) .
Since D(WE), together with the uniform metric, is a complete metric space, and since T () is a
contraction, given any W 2 D(WE); limn!1 T ()nW exists and belongs to D(WE). Since W  is
the unique xed point to the mapping T () : B ! B, it must be that W  = limn!1 T ()nW .
Hence, W  2 D(WE): That is, for any t; any t 2 t, W (t) WE(t): The result then follows
by noting that, for any 1 2 n


	
,
W (1) = T ()W (1)
= 1(1) + 1    (1(1))  (1) 0(1(1))
  (1  )Uo + maxfE~2j1 [W
(~
2
)];E~1 [W
(~1)]g
< 1 + e
E    (eE)  (1  )Uo
+maxfE~j1 [WE(~)];E~1 [WE(~1)]g
= WE(1),
where the inequality is strict because (1) > 0 on n


	
. 
The next lemma combines the results in the previous two lemmas to establish Part (i) in the
proposition.
Lemma A3. There exists t  1 such that, for any t > t, any t 2 t,
E~jt [W
E(~)]  E~1 [WE(~1)] =) E~t+1jt [W
(~
t+1
)] > E~1 [W
(~1)].
Proof of Lemma A3. Recall that WE;c
0
, as dened in Lemma A1, is the value function for the
stopping problem with e¢ cient ow payo¤s t + eE    
 
eE
  (1  )Uo and exogenous separation
payo¤ c0. Now let c0 = E~1
h
W (~1)
i
. Below, we will compare the function WE;c
0
with the value
function W  associated with the prot-maximizing stopping problem. Recall that the latter is a
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stopping problem with ow payo¤s, for each t, and each t, given by
V St
 
t
  t (t) + t    (t (t))  (1)J t1  t 0(t (t))  (1  )Uo
and separation payo¤ c0 = E~1
h
W (~1)
i
. By the property of vanishing impulse responses, for any
! > 0, there exists t such that, for any t > t, any t 2 t, V St(t) > t+eE  (eE) (1  )Uo !:
That is, for t > t, the ow payo¤ in the stopping problem that leads to the rms optimal contract is
never less by more than ! than the corresponding ow payo¤ in the stopping problem with e¢ cient
ow payo¤s and exogenous separation payo¤ c0 = E~1
h
W (~1)
i
. In terms of value functions, this
implies that, for all t > t, all t 2 t,
W (t) WE;c0(t)  !
1   . (16)
To see this, consider the set W  B of all bounded functions W from A  [1t=1t to R such that,
for all t > t, all t 2 t, W (t) WE;c0(t)  !1  and consider the operator Tc0 : B ! B dened, for
all t > t, all t 2 t, by
Tc0W (
t) = V St
 
t

+ maxfE~t+1jt [W (~
t+1
)]; c0g.
The set W is closed under Tc0 : Indeed, if W 2 W, then, for any t > t, any t 2 t,
Tc0W (
t) WE;c0(t) = V St(t) + maxfE~t+1jt [W (~
t+1
)]; c0g
 
 
t + e
E    (eE)  (1  )Uo
+maxfE~jt [WE;c
0
(~)]; c0g
!
  !   !
1   =  
!
1   .
SinceW, together with the uniform metric, is a complete metric space, and since Tc0 is a contraction,
given any W 2 W; limn!1 Tnc0W exists and belongs toW. Furthermore, because c0 = E~1
h
W (~1)
i
,
it must be that W  = limn!1 Tnc0W . Hence, W
 2 W, which proves (16).
Now, let c00 = E~1
h
WE(~1)
i
. By Lemma A2, c00 > c0. Now observe that WE = WE;c00 : It follows
that, for all t > t and all t 2 t; if E~jt
h
WE(~)
i
 E~1
h
WE(~1)
i
, then
E~t+1jt [W
(~
t+1
)]  E~jt [WE;c
0
(~)]  !
1  
> E~1 [W
(~1)] +   !
1   .
The rst inequality follows from (16), while the second inequality follows from Lemma A1 using
c0 = E~1
h
W (~1)
i
and choosing  as in that lemma. The result then follows by choosing ! su¢ ciently
small that   !1  > 0: 
Part (ii). The proof follows from two lemmas. Lemma A4 establishes Lipschitz continuity in
t of the expected value of continuing the relationship in period t+ 1; respectively under the rms
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prot-maximizing contract and the e¢ cient contract. This result is then used in Lemma A5 to prove
Part (ii) of the proposition.
Lemma A4. Suppose that F satises the properties of Condition LC. Then, for each t  2 and
each t 1 2 t 1, E~t+1j(t 1;)
h
W (~
t+1
)
i
is Lipschitz continuous over . Moreover, E~j
h
WE(~)
i
is Lipschitz continuous over .
Proof of Lemma A4. We show that, for any t  2 any t 1 2 t 1, E~t+1j(t 1;)
h
W (~
t+1
)
i
is
Lipschitz continuous over . The proof that E~j
h
WE(~)
i
is Lipschitz continuous over  is similar
and omitted. Let
M  e
E +K     eE  (1  )Uo
1   and m 
1 + L+ 2MK
1  
where K = max
jj ; 	 and L > 0 is a uniform bound on  0:
We will show that, for any 1 2 ; any t  2; the function W (1; ) is Lipschitz continuous
over t>1 = 
t 1 with constant m. For this purpose, let L(M;m)  B denote the space of functions
W : A! R that satisfy the following properties: (i) for any t; any t 2 t; W (t) M ; (ii) for any
1 2 ; any t  2, W (1; ) is Lipschitz continuous over t>1 with constant m; (iii) for any 1 2 ;
any t  2, W (1; ) is nondecreasing over t>1:
We rst show that L(M;m) is closed under the operator T () dened in Proposition 3. To see
this, take an arbitrary W 2 L(M;m). First note that, for any t; any t 2 t,
T ()W (t) = V St(t) + maxfE~t+1jt [W (~
t+1
)];E~1 [W (
~1)]g
 eE +K    (eE)  (1  )Uo + M = M .
Next note that, for any t; any t 2 t, T ()W (t)   K   M >  M . The function T ()W thus
satises property (i). To see that the function T ()W satises property (ii), let t  2 and consider an
arbitrary period  ; with 2    t. Then take two arbitrary sequences ( 1; 0 ; t> ); ( 1; 00 ; t> ) 2
t. Suppose, without loss of generality, that 0 > 
00
 . Then,
T ()W ( 1; 0 ; 
t
> )  T ()W ( 1; 00 ; t> ) (17)
=

t (
t) + t    (t (t))  (1)J t1(t) 0(t (t))  (1  )Uo

t=( 1;0 ;t> )
  t (t) + t    (t (t))  (1)J t1(t) 0(t (t))  (1  )Uot=( 1;00 ;t> )
+
0@ maxnE~t+1j( 1;0 ;t> )[W (~t+1)];E~1 [W (~1)]o
 max
n
E~t+1j( 1;00 ;t> )[W (
~
t+1
)];E~1 [W (
~1)]
o 1A
The rst two terms on the right-hand side of (17) are no greater than (1 + L)
 
0   00

. This can
be derived as follows. For any 2    t, any t 2 t, any e 2 E, dene gt(t; e) = e+ t    (e) 
(1)J
t
1
 
t

 0(e)   (1  )Uo. For any t = ( 1;  ; t> ) 2 t, gt is Lipschitz continuous in 
and @@ gt(
 1;  ; t> ; e)  1 + L for all e 2 E and almost all  2 . The same sequence of
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inequalities as in Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002) then implies the result. The nal term on
the right-hand side in (17) is no greater than (2MK +m)
 
0   00

. This follows because
E~t+1j( 1;0 ;t> )[W (
~
t+1
)]  E~t+1j( 1;00 ;t> )[W (
~
t+1
)] (18)
= E~t+1j( 1;0 ;t> )[W (
 1; 0 ; 
t
> ;
~t+1)]
 E~t+1j( 1;00 ;t> )[W (
 1; 0 ; 
t
> ;
~t+1)]
+E~t+1j( 1;00 ;t> )[W (
 1; 0 ; 
t
> ;
~t+1) W ( 1; 00 ; t> ; ~t+1)]
=
Z

W ( 1; 0 ; 
t
> ; t+1)

f
 
t+1j 1; 0 ; t>
  f  t+1j 1; 00 ; t> dt+1
+E~t+1j( 1;00 ;t> )[W (
 1; 0 ; 
t
> ;
~t+1) W ( 1; 00 ; t> ; ~t+1)]
 (2MK +m)  0   00 ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that, for any t+1 2 t+1; any ( 1; t> ); the function
ft+1(t+1j 1; ; t> ) is Lipschitz continuous with constant  together with the fact that jtj  K
all t: We conclude that
T ()W ( 1; 0 ; 
t
> )  T ()W ( 1; 00 ; t> )  (1 + L+ 2MK + m)
 
0   00

= m
 
0   00

.
Since ( 1; 0 ; 
t
> ) and (
 1; 00 ; 
t
> ) were arbitrary, it follows that for any 1 2 , and any t, the
function T ()W (1; ) is Lipschitz continuous over t>1 with constantm; i.e. T ()W indeed satises
property (ii) above. Lastly that T ()W satises property (iii) follows from the fact that the mapping
T () preserves the monotonicity ofW . We thus conclude that T ()W 2 L(M;m) which veries that
L(M;m) is closed under the T () operator. The fact that L(M;m)  B, endowed with the uniform
metric, is a complete metric space, together with the fact that T () is a contraction, then implies
that W  2 L(M;m). Using the same argument as in (18), we then have that E~t+1j(t 1;)[W (~
t+1
)]
is Lipschitz continuous over  with constant (2MK +m) : 
The next lemma uses the result in the previous lemma to establish Part (ii) in the proposition.
Lemma A5. Suppose that the conditions in Lemma A4 hold. Then the result in Part (ii) in the
proposition holds.
Proof of Lemma A5. Let t be as dened in Lemma A3. Take an arbitrary t > t and re-
call that we are assuming that E 2 int fg. The continuity of E~j[WE(~)] established in the
previous lemma, implies E~jE [W
E(~)] = E~1 [W
E(~1)]. Since t > t, by Lemma A3, it follows
that E~t+1j(t 1;E)[W
(~
t+1
)] > E~1 [W
(~1)]. By Lemma A4, E~t+1j(t 1;)[W
(~
t+1
)] is continuous.
Since E 2 int fg, there exists  > 0 such that, for all  t 1; t 2 t with t 2 (E   ; E),
E~t+1j(t 1;t)[W
(~
t+1
)] > E~1 [W
(~1)]. It follows that t
 
t 1

< E .  
Proof of Corollary 2. Firstly, consider the case where, for all 1 > E , E~2j1 [W
(~
2
)] >
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E~1 [W
(~1)]. Proposition 6, together with the monotonicity property of W  established in Propo-
sition 5, then implies that, for any t  1, any t 2 t such that 1; t > E , E~t+1jt [W (~
t+1
)] >
E~1 [W
(~1)]: This means that, for any t any t 2 t such that t 1(t 1) = 1 and t (t) = 0,
necessarily Et (
t) = 0 (except for the possibility that t is such that s = E for some s  t, which,
however, has zero measure). That is, any manager who is red in period t under the rms prot-
maximizing contract, is either red in the same period or earlier under the e¢ cient contract. The
result in the proposition then holds for t = t = 1:
Next, assume that there exists a 1 > E such that E~2j1 [W
(~
2
)] < E~1 [W
(~1)], which implies
that 1 > 
E . By assumption, the manager is retained with positive probability after the rst period,
i.e. 1 2 (E ; ): The result then holds by letting t = 2. In this case, the existence of a t  t satisfying
the property in the Corollary follows directly from Proposition 8.
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